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FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT REQUIREMENT IN
INJUNCTION SUITS
THE expansion or contraction of federal jurisdiction under the amount in
controversy requirement' has important political consequences. 2 It affects
the distribution of power between federal and state courts; and in the case
of injunctions against officials involves further the balance between the
executive and judicial branches of the Federal Government, and the pro-
priety of interference by the federal judiciary with the representatives of
1. The jurisdictional provision reads in part: "The district courts shall have orig-
inal jurisdiction ... of all suits of a civil nature . . .where the matter in controversy
exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000 and (a) arises under
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties . ..or (b) is between citizens
of different States, . . ." 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §41 (1) (1934). There
are, however, numerous types of "case" requiring no jurisdictional amount; among the
more important of these are criminal cases, cases in admiralty, in bankruptcy; suits aris-
ing under the interstate commerce laws, the patent and copyright laws; and suits concern-
ing civil rights. 36 STAT. 1091-1093 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §41 (1934).
2. See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and
State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499; Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1934 (1935) 49 HARv. L. REV. 68, 91.
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state governments. Congress, by twice raising the jurisdictional amount,3
has shown its tendency to contract federal jurisdiction in favor of state
courts; and by restricting the power of federal courts to issue injunctions,4
has further endeavored to protect from federal judicial interference the
executive arm of both federal and state governments.5
The Supreme Court, in several recent decisions involving jurisdictional
amount in injunction suits, has lent its support to the Congressional policy.
In Healy v. Ratta,0 decided in 1934, the Court ruled that in a suit to enjoin
a license tax the amount in controversy was confined to the amount of the
tax. There was ample support for the decision ;- but there were also numerous
lower court precedents on which the Court could have sustained jurisdiction.8
The important feature of the decision is the forthright choice in favor of
narrower jurisdiction. In reaching its conclusion, the Court significantly
observed:
"The policy of the statute calls for its strict construction.
Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments,
which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously
confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute
has defined." 9
3. By the Act of March 3, 1887, 24 STAT. 552 (187), the amount was increased
from $500 to $2,000. Congressional debates show that the proponents of the bill were
interested in preserving the importance of state courts. See IS CoNG. R c. 2544 (1127).
By the Act of March 3, 1911, 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §41 (1) (1934), the
amount was further increased to $3,000. A continued interest in protecting state courts
is shown by the Congressional debates. See 46 CoNG. R.c. 1075, 1076 (1911).
4. The requirement of a three judge court to issue an interlocutory injunction sus-
pending operation of a state statute or restraining an order of a state commission, 3#
STAT. 557, 1162 (1911), 37 STAT. 1013 (1913), 43 STAT. 938 (1925), 28 U. S. C. §3S0
(1934), and the extension in 1937 of this provision to include the Federal Government,
50 STAT. 752 (1937), 28 U. S. C. § 3SOa (Supp. 1938), are designed to prevent the in-
discriminate issuance of injunctions by federal courts. See 3 Mloom's FuzMxL Pnmcacu
(1938) 3537; DoDD, CASES ON CON TITUTIo0,.AL LAW (1937) 25. The Johnson Act, 48
STAT. 775 (1934);28 U. S. C. §41 (1), restricts the issuance of an injunction against a
state regulatory commission. A similar restriction against te issuance of state tax in-
junctions was added by the Act of August 21, 1937, 50 STAT. 738 (1937), 28 U. S. C.
§41 (1) (Supp. 1938). Rm,. STAT. §3224 (1875), 26 U. S. C. § 1543 (1934), prohibits
an injunction against a federal tax. For a discussion of the application of these restric-
tions see 1 MooRn's FEDERAL. PRAcrIcE (1933) 202-208.
5. In other fields Congress has restricted federal jurisdiction. For an extended
review of the "established trend of legislation limiting the jurisdiction of the federal
trial courts," see Gay v. Ruff, 292 U. S. 25, 35-36 (1934).
6. 292 U. S. 263 (1934).
7. Holt v. Indiana .ffg. Co., 176 U. S. 68 (1900); Washington & G. R. R. Co.
v. District of Columbia, 146 U. S. 227 (1892).
S. Campbell Baking Co. v. Maryville, 31 F. (2d) 466 (W. D. Mo. 1929); City of
Hutchinson v. Beckham, 118 Fed. 399 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) ; Humes v. Ft. Smith, 93 Fed.
857 (C. C. XV. D. Ark. 1899).
9. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263, 270. 'Mr. Justice Stone, who wrote the opinion,
has made similar statements on other occasions. See Mfatthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S.
521, 525 (1932) ; Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U. S. 64, 73 (1935).
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The restrictive principle of the Healy case was carried further by McNutt
v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation,0 a case involving a statute
regulating auto-financing. In order to show jurisdiction, counsel for plaintiff
cited the general rule that "the value of the object or right to be protected
against interference"" was the standard for measuring the amount involved,
The Court adopted this general standard, but pointed out that in this case
the right to be protected was not the broad right to conduct the business,
which would be measured by the value of the business, but the specific right
to be free of regulation, "measured by the loss, if any, which would follow
the enforcement of the rules prescribed."' 1 2 The Court then went on to put
force into this requirement for precision in ascertaining the right to be pro-
tected, by resolving a long-standing conflict over the status of the burden
of proof. In definite terms, the rule was set forth that one who invokes
jurisdiction must prove that jurisdiction is present.
The ramifications of this case were demonstrated little more than six months
later when the Court on two occasions applied the burden of proof rule with
considerable strictness. In Kroger Grocery & Baking Company v. Lut.,1 3
the plaintiff tried to meet the burden of proof by establishing an annual loss,
under a regulatory statute, of $500 which if capitalized at 5% would amount
to $10,000. Since, however, the statute was to expire shortly, the Court
refused to accept capitalization as proof of the extent of injury and required
that the loss be confined to the precise period for which the statute was
certain to run. In KVOS v. Associated Press,14 the Associated Press sued
to enjoin a radio station from pirating news gathered by its press service.
In reversing on jurisdiction, the Court again followed the McNutt formula,
and dismissed as irrelevant general facts about annual expenditures and the
magnitude of the operations of the association. The attempt by the association
to prove specific damage was also dismissed, not as irrelevant, but as un-
satisfactory.1'
The 1938 term of the Supreme Court, however, produced a case which
raises a doubt as to whether the strictness of preceding terms is to continue.
Gibbs v. Buck' G involved a Florida statute prohibiting the use of the copy-
10. 298 U. S. 178 (1936). McNutt v. McHenry Chevrolet Co., 298 U. S. 190 (1936),
is a companion case with an identical holding.
11. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U. S. 178, 181 (1936). For
variations on the manner of stating the rule, see 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAc'rIcE (1938)
530-532.
12. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U. S. 178, 181 (1936).
13. 299 U. S. 300 (1936).
14. 299 U. S. 269 (1936).
15. An affidavit was offered alleging a loss of an $8,000 a month contribution should
the newspapers in the area of the radio station withdraw. In answer to this the Court
pointed out that it had not been shown in what way withdrawal of the $8,000 contribu-
tion would injure the remaining members, and that even withdrawal was only a con-
clusion unsupported by evidence. KVOS v. Associated Press, 299 U. S. 269, 279 (1936).
16. 307 U. S. 66 (1939). Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U. S. 95 (1939), is a companion
case which, however, differs from the Gibbs case in that a regulatory, not a prohibitory,
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right pool of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.17
Gene Buck, president of the Society, and other members brought a repre-
sentative suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The value of the "right
to conduct the business free of the prohibition of the statute"'u was accepted
as the criterion for measuring the jurisdictional sum. But in finding this right
to exceed $3,000, the opinion used language which gave the impression that
the Court was making speculative deductions from the proved facts.10 Never-
theless, this is undoubtedly a case in which the jurisdictional amount was
present.2 0 And in view of the fact that the Court expressly reaffirmed the
burden of proof rule and, further, that the case is not one in which juris-
diction was sustained in the absence of proof, but rather one in which the
Court failed to explain dearly how the admitted facts proved jurisdiction,
there is no reason to anticipate a reversal of attitude.
From these recent cases two propositions are dear. First, the burden of
proof rests on the proponent of jurisdiction; and second, in injunction suits,
precision is required in showing exactly what the injunction is to protect.
Combined, these two propositions provide one rule for determining the
jurisdictional amount in injunction suits - one who invokes jurisdiction must
prove that the value of the precise injury threatened exceeds $3,000. One
of the immediate effects of this rule is to settle the problem of whether the
right in controversy should be measured by its value to the plaintiff or by
the loss to the defendant which would result from enforcement of the right.
The point of view may make quite a difference. For example, the value
to the plaintiff of the abatement of a nuisance may differ from the value to
statute was involved. The case was remanded to permit members to show whether the
cost of complying with the statute exceeded $3,000.
17. The statute declares that any substantial combination of copyright holders which
fixes prices or issues licenses for performance is illegal. FLAx. CoMp. GE::. LAws ANI:.
(Skillman Supp. 1938) § 7954(1).
18. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66, 74 (1939).
19. Although admitting that net profits had not been shown, the Court apparently
assumed that if $60,000 a year ,vas collected in Florida, and if the business throughout
the country was profitable, the jurisdictional amount was necessarily present. Inasmuch
as the Court measured the jurisdictional amount only in terms of loss to individual
members, and not to the association, it would seem necessary to show that the profit
obtained through the association exceeded the aggregate profit which the members could
obtain operating independently.
20. If the method of determining the value of continuing in business, the going-
concern value minus the liquidation value [see p. 279 infra] were used, the amount would
obviously exceed $3,000 in aggregate for the members. There would be no liquidation
value of the association, aside from office furniture, and the going-concern value would
be quite large if annual income was $60,000. That the members could not independently
operate profitably is undoubtedly the case, even though the statement of facts as given
by the Court does not clearly show it. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, argued that it was
not shown that independent operation would be unprofitable; but he gave away his own
case by subsequently arguing that the bond fixed by the court below should have been
higher in order to indemnify the citizens who were paying "tribute" to the Society.
Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66, 91, 94 (1939).
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the defendant of the object causing the nuisance. Although the Supreme
Court has long adopted the plaintiff's point of view, 21 some lower courts
have continued to use that of the defendant. 22 In a suit originating in a
federal court, this test is clearly at variance with the McNutt rule that the
plaintiff must prove his loss. 23 In a case of removal from a state court,
on the other hand, the fact that a defendant, who invokes jurisdiction, must
sustain the burden of proof would, at first blush, lead to the belief that the
defendant's stake in the case should govern. 24 But such an interpretation
expressly violates the terms of the removal statute,25 which requires that suits
not originally cognizable by a federal court should not gain entrance on
removal. The interpretation, moreover, is not logically justified. It is true
that the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant; but the substance of
the proof required remains the same. In cases of removal, therefore, as well
as in cases of original federal jurisdiction, the McNutt and KVOS cases,
with their emphasis on proof of the exact loss to the plaintiff, indicate the
incorrectness of the lower court decisions which adopt the defendant's view-
point, and so help to eliminate one of the confusing elements in the problem
of determining jurisdiction.26
The burden of proof requirement, however, raises a host of problems of
proof in injunction suits. In the first place, there may be trouble in presenting
factual data which will measure accurately the loss ensuing if the injunction
prayed fof is not granted. Suppose, for example, the injunction seeks to
prevent interference with a particular business. If the interference is of such
a nature as to require expenditure of more than $3,000, no difficulty is
presented. 27 But if the only damage is a decrease in business, a complainant
21. Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U. S. 121
(1915); Hunt v. N. Y. Cotton Exchange, 205 U. S. 322 (1907). See Doble, Jurisdic-
tional Amount in the United States District Courts (1925) 38 HARV. L. REV. 733, 742-744.
22. Armstrong v. Townsend, 8 F. Supp. 953 (S. D. Ind. 1934), and Ross v. Southern
Ry. Co., 20 F. Supp. 556 (W. D. S. C. 1937), are the most recent injunction suits to
take the defendant's viewpoint.
23. In Armstrong v. Townsend, 8 F. Supp. 953 (S. D. Ind. 1934), the plaintiff sought
to enjoin the lieutenant governor of Indiana from receiving a salary of $6,000 a year.
From the plaintiff's viewpoint it was admitted that there was no jurisdiction, but the
court said the pecuniary loss to either party was the criterion.
24. In Ross v. Southern Ry., 20 F. Supp. 556, 557 (W. D. S. C. 1937), the court
declared: " . . . it is not the claim of the plaintiff, but the value of the property of
which the defendant may be deprived . . . which is the test of the jurisdictional amount."
25. 36 STAT. 1094 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 71 (1934).
26. See Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States Di?.trict Court (1925)
38 HARV. L. Rzv. 733, 736, 752; 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 511-512.
27. The cost of compliance may be used. Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, 304 U. S. 209 (1938); see Fajardo Sugar Co. v. Holcomb, 16 F.
(2d) 92, 94 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926). Although the question has not been raised, it would
appear that the cost of compliance would be net cost. A requirement to spend $4,000 in
advertising should not provide jurisdiction if it could be proved that profits would in-
crease by $4,000.
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may be faced with a nice accounting problem. If decrease in sales is shown,
a court may well require a precise showing of the relationship between inter-
ference and decreased sales, and an equally precise relationship betwveen
decreased sales and the loss which is sustained.28 It may be exceedingly
difficult to marshal statistics which will dearly show these relationships. If
an injunction seeks to prevent outright proMbition of a business, a plaintiff
has, in addition to the problem of presenting his proof, the question of what
is to be the measure of the right to be free from prohibition. In the Gibbs
case, which involved prohibition, the Court talked about whether the business
was profitable.209 It could hardly be maintained, however, that suppression
of an unprofitable business involves no loss; the owner may not only have
assets valuable in that business alone, he may also have an intangible expecta-
tion that he will profit in the future. In a case of absolute prohibition, the
only exact measure of the value of the right to be free from the prohibition
would appear to be the difference between the going-concern value of the
business and the liquidation value.mI A large-scale concern would, in all
probability, have little difficulty showing that this differential exceeded $3,000;
but a small business might find it an insuperable task to reduce to monetary
terms the value of continuing in business. If a plaintiff threatened with either
regulation or prohibition had not yet gone into business, he would be faced
with even greater difficulties of proof, because he would have no past ex-
perience on which to base estimated loss in the future.31
A somewhat similar problem confronts a non-profit organization which
conducts a business. In the KVOS case the Supreme Court by way of
dictum raised the question whether an organization like the Associated Press,
which did not operate for profit but rather divided operating expense among
its members, could lose anything at all.32 If the Court literally meant that
a non-profit association could not per se suffer a loss, it was ignoring the
28. See S. S. Kresge Co. v. Amsler, 99 F. (2d) 503, 506 (C. C. A. 8th, 193S), ceri.
denzied, 306 U. S. 641 (1939).
29. "While the net profits of the business in Florida is not shown, the business of
the Society, as a whole, is profitable" Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66, 74 (1939).
30. See 2 K.xsTER, AnvA..cED AccouiriNG (1933) 97, for a definition of going-con-
cern value-the value "at which the various asset, liability, and proprietorship items
should be carried when viewed from the standpoint of a concern which expects to con-
tinue operations . . ." The liquidation value would be, for the purposes of determining
the value of the business, the cash remaining after sale of all assets and payment of all
debts. Id. at 765.
31. In Equality Cleaners & Laundry, Inc. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board,
26 F. Supp. 705, 706 (S. D. Fla. 1939), the court observed that "since plaintiffs have
never been actually in business . . . there is no yardstick by which to measure this
loss."
32. "... the respondent makes no profit from furnishing news to its members but
equitably divides the expense amongst them. The association cannot therefore lose the
$,8,000 in question." KVOS v. Associated Press, 299 U. S. 269, 278 (1936). See dis-
cussion in note 15 supra.
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modern concept of corporate activity and putting this type of corporate body
at a disadvantage in protecting its interests.83 In Gibbs v. Buck the Court,
although sidestepping the issue of whether a non-profit organization could
sue in its own behalf, impliedly decided that such an association could sustain
a loss,3 4 by holding that individual members of a non-profit organization
could show their individual losses; and, inasmuch as they had a common
and undivided interest, could also aggregate the losses.3, But if the common
and undivided interest which allows aggregation is the interest in conducting
a business through an association, there seems no reason for not permitting
the association itself to sue. In any event, the fact that the statement in the
KVOS case was a dictum 0 and the fact that the Gibbs case clearly enables
members of a non-profit organization to protect their interests in the associa-
tion by aggregating individual losses, leave little reason to fear that this
important form of corporate activity is to be denied access to federal courts.8 7
In addition to the problem of finding tangible evidence of injury, the burden
of proof requirement creates another difficulty - that of ascertaining the
period of time for which the prospective loss will be sustained. If it is clear
that the injury will be permanent-for example, if a regulatory commission
orders the institution of a permanent service to consumers,38 or a nuisance
threatens to cause a decrease in property values319 - the immediate loss may
be capitalized. On the other hand, where a regulatory statute is to expire
33. See I MOORz'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 521, n. 45.
34. In considering whether a non-profit association can sustain a loss, it may be per-
tinent to note that not all such associations are non-profit in the same sense. Thus
ASCAP, in the Buck case, actually collects profits for distribution to its members; while
the Associated Press, in the KVOS case, collects fees from its members for services
rendered. It seems, however, that an association equally suffers a loss whether profits
decrease or expenses mount.
35. It is an accepted rule that aggregation is allowed when the interest is one which
is common and undivided. Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. 566 (U. S. 1829); Local No. 7 v.
Bowen, 278 Fed. 271 (S. D. Tex. 1922) ; see Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U. S. 594, 596 (1916).
See Blume, Jurisdictional Amount in Representative Suits (1931) 15 Miqr;. L. REv. 501.
36. The importance of the dictum was lessened by the holding of the case that tile
Associated Press had not shown how its members would be injured. See the discussion
in note 15 supra.
37. It should be noted that it is essential that the non-profit organization conduct a
business or engage in some form of activity which is the subject of the suit. Common
membership alone is not sufficient to justify aggregation, or to permit a suit by the asso-
ciation. For example, members of an association have not been allowed to aggregate
taxes levied against them individually for membership in the association. Rogers v. Hen-
nepin County, 239 U. S. 621 (1916).
38. Western & A. R. R. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, 261 U. S. 264 (1923).
39. In the case of a nuisance an expert on real estate estimates the value of the land
with and without the nuisance. This means that the witness has speculated over the
period of time that the nuisance will last and reduced that speculation to an immediate
capital value. See Leighton v. Minneapolis, 16 F. Supp. 101 (D. Minn. 1936), for an
example of this method of determining the amount in controversy.
[Vol. 49: 274
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in a short time, 0 or where the injunction will run only until an action at
law is prosecuted,4 1 there is a clear indication of how long the injury will
last. But in cases where neither permanence nor definite cessation is certain,
the necessity for speculation over the duration of the injury leads to con-
siderable uncertainty as to whether the court will assume jurisdiction.
Most of the problems connected with the burden of proof requirement
are obviated in tax cases by the rule of the Hcaly case that only the amount
of the tax demanded is in dispute.42 There may, however, be instances where
more than the tax is in controversy, in which case the burden of proof rule
may have to be used to show whether or not the tax plus the additional
factors involved make up the jurisdictional sum. For example, the Supreme
Court found it necessary in the Healv case to distinguish an earlier decision
which had held that where a tax was resisted on the ground that a state
statute granted a perpetual exemption from taxation, the exemption, not the
tax, was the matter in controversy. 43 If a similar statutory exemption case
arose today, the plaintiff would have to prove the value of the exemption,
and it is quite possible that any attempt at proof would be so speculative
that only the amount of the tax could be used. 4 4 A somewhat similar problem
arises when a tax demanded is an installment of a sinking fund tax or of a
special assessment. In these cases the total tax which would have to be paid,
not the installment, has been held to be the amount in controversV," provided
the validity of the bond issue or the assessment was attacked. 4' Even though
40. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lutz, 299 U. S. 300 (1935), is an example.
41. This method of determining the period of injury could be used, for example, in
labor injunction cases as a means of setting the period for which loss could Le estimated.
The period of the unlawful injury would not exceed the time required to determine in
a tort action the legality of the strike. But see note 56 infra, for a more restrictive rule
which could be used in labor injunctions.
42. It is important to note that taxes against different individuals may nkst he aggre-
gated. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U. S. 583 (1939); Rogers v. Hennepin County,
239 U. S. 621 (1916). But it appears that if one individual really pays the taxes tech-
nically levied against his employees, the total tax may be used. Pavel v. Richard, 23 F.
Supp. 992 (NV. D. La. 193S), so holds on the authority of Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263
(1934). The Healy case, however, is not clear on this point, and it may well U2 that
the Supreme Court will allow aggregation only when the tax is technically demanded
of the employer.
43. Berryman . Whitman College, 222 U. S. 334 (1912). The Berryman decsion
has been criticized. See Comment (1937) 25 C.LiF. L. REv. 336, 344; but see 1 MNle.xs
FEFDAL PRAcricE (1938) 534.
44. The Supreme Court has indicated that the exemption exception is not to b2
extended. In Gypsy Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 292 U. S. 611 (1934), the Court
modified a lower court decree so as to dismiss on jurisdiction in a case where the plaintiff
was claiming that a constitutional immunity was an exemption within the exception.
45. Sinking fund: Helena v. Helena Waterworks Co., 173 Fed. 13 (C. C. A. 9th,
1909); Colvin v. Jacksonville, 158 U. S. 456 (1895) semble. Assessment: Ogden City
v. Armstrong, 168 U. S. 224 (1897).
46. See Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 58 F. (2d) 979, 980 (C. C. A. Sth,
1932).
19391
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it is unlikely that collection of a sinking fund tax or assessment will be
discontinued, it is possible, either under the Healy case with its argument that
future exactions are speculative or under the burden of proof rule, to limit
the amount in dispute to the immediate tax demanded.
There are, however, situations when it may not be possible to confine the
jurisdictional sum to the amount of the tax. If the granting of a license or
other privilege is conditioned on the payment of a tax plus the filing of
comprehensive data or a substantial bond, it is clear that not the tax alone,
but the tax plus the cost of complying with the statute, are disputed. The
rule of the Healy case limits the tax to the amount immediately demanded;
under the burden of proof rule it would be possible to limit compliance to
the immediate cost on the ground that future costs are speculative. If a
statute allows discretion in granting a license or privilege irrespective of
payment of the tax, the application of the general tax rule depends upon
whether or not the tax has been tendered at the time of suit. If there has
been no tender, the controversy can be limited to the amount of the tax on
the ground that the plaintiff cannot prove that the tax would be refused.
But if the tax is tendered and refused, the controversy is no longer over the
tax, but over the right to a license or privilege. Consequently, the loss attri-
butable to a denial of that right would be the criterion. 47 A somewhat anal-
ogous situation is that of an attack on a statute by one who asserts that his
business will be ruined because the state threatens to prohibit his dealing with
a manufacturer who refuses to pay a privilege tax and to file required in-
formation. 48 In such a case, the loss which will follow from prohibition
should be the amount in controversy 49 even though the immediate issue to
be decided is the legality of the tax and the requirement to file data.
The question whether the matter in controversy is greater than the tax
demanded may also arise where a plaintiff contends that a tax is so oppressive
that payment will destroy his business. The Healy case is careful to say that
the injurious effects of non-payment, such as revocation of a license or heavy
penalties, are collateral to the issue in controversy because payment would
avoid the effects. But if the burden of the tax will destroy the business as
effectively as the consequences of non-payment, it is hardly possible to dismiss
the value of the business as collateral to the controversy. It is certain,
47. In McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 58 F. (2d) 994, 998 (S. D. W. Va. 1931),
aff'd, 286 U. S. 131 (1932), the court, in support of its conclusion that the jurisdictional
amount in a license tax injunction suit was measured by the value of the business, argued
that the right to do business was clearly in issue where the licensing authority was given
"some discretion as to granting or refusing to grant the permit."
48. Dugan v. Bridges, 16 F. Supp. 694 (D. N. H. 1936).
49. Ibid.
50. Cf. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U. S. 498 (1932), where the
Court refused to follow the Congressional prohibition of an injunction against a federal




however, that if destruction of the business would ensue only after several
years of payment of the tax, the amount in controversy would be only the
tax demanded, because under the Healy rule future taxes are too speculative.
But if a complainant could show that the single tax demanded would imme-
diately destroy his business, he might be able to sustain jurisdiction even
though the tax were less than $3,000.
The strict limitation of amount in the tax cases to the amount of the tax
demanded, except where more than the taxing power is clearly in dispute,51
is a striking illustration of the renewed tendency of the courts to respect the
Congressional policy of restricting judicial interference with government
functions.52 The strict standards imposed by the burden of proof rule in
injunction suits show the same restrictive tendency, but are subject to a
good deal more flexibility in application. The courts, by varying the amount
of proof required, can, within the general restrictive policy, impose particularly
strict requirements on types of injunction especially disfavored by Congres-
sional policy. Thus injunctions seeking to interfere with state regulatory
commissions,53 injunctions interfering with executive action, state or federal,
and labor injunctions, disapproved by Congress in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act,5 can be dealt with particularly harshly.50
On the other hand, the flexibility of the standards allows the courts to be
more liberal in sustaining jurisdiction where Congressiohal policy objections
are absent. Thus private injunctions, which involve no political problems, 7
may be more freely admitted, despite the identity of the formal standard for
determining the amount in controversy- the value of the right to be free
from interference. It is true that in the KTOS case, which involved a private
injunction, the Supreme Court imposed strict standards of proof. But in
subsequent lower court cases, general allegations of the amount in contro-
versy, plus a recitation of the value of the business or good will, have been
51. There is a question, of course, whether the sinking fund tax rule, allowing more
than the tax demanded, has been overruled by Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263 (1934).
See note 45 supra, and accompanying text.
52. See the observations in Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525 (1932), and in
Albertville Nat. Bank v. 'Marshall County, 71 F. (2d) 848, 849 (C. C. A. Sth, 1934).
53. The Johnson Act, 48 SAT. 775, 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1) (1934), prohibiting an in-
junction except where there is no remedy in state courts.
54. Congress has acted against all public injunction suits by requiring a hearing
before a three judge court. See note 4 supra.
55. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115 (1934).
56. See S. S. Kresge Co. v. Amsler, 99 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), ccrt. dceied,
306 U. S. 641 (1939), a labor injunction case in which the court took great pains'to inter-
pret the burden of proof rule as strictly as possible. The fact that the period for which
a strike will continue is uncertain allows a coirt to refuse to permit any computation
of future losses on the grounds that continuation is too speculative.
57. The distinction between public and private injunctions has often been stressed.
See 1 MoopE's FEDERAL PRPcricE (1938) 536; Comment (1937) 25 CALwF. L Rm,. 33,
347; Comment (1934) 48 HARv. L. Rnv. 95, 101.
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